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Abstract 
In this paper we evaluate the gender wage gap component due to differences in characteristics’ 
rewards in Italy. The main focus is on the relationship between human capital characteristics 
and gender differences in rewards. We propose a methodology that combines the quantile 
regression analysis with non-parametric procedures for the estimation of the probability 
density functions of reward differentials in order to evaluate the evolution of the gap due to 
human capital characteristics. The analysis is carried out on Italian data taken from the latest 
available cross-section of the European Community Household Panel (2001). Our study 
suggests that education can be a good productivity signal and helps reduce the range of the 
gap; furthermore, highly-educated women experience lesser gender-based pay differences as 
the length of the employment relationship increases. 
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1.  Introduction 
Empirical studied conducted in a large number of countries have 
demonstrated that gender wage gaps may be largely attributed to 
differences between men and women in the rewards to their productive 
characteristics and not to differences in such characteristics.
1 The most 
recent analyses, which evaluate the distributions of wage gaps, highlight 
furthermore how the extension of such a gap changes with the variations in 
women’s wage levels. The results of these studies are country-specific, and 
it is difficult to draw general conclusions, yet we may say, in the vast 
majority of cases, that a greater incidence of the gap may be found with 
regard to skills in correspondence with the higher levels of pay, 
characterising the presence of glass ceiling patterns (Albrecht et al., 2003; 
Albrecht et al., 2004; Arulampalam et al., 2007). However, there are also 
numerous cases of countries in which a greater gap may be found in 
correspondence with lower levels of pay and, therefore, with entrance-level 
working profiles, or ones characterised by a low level of skills; here we 
might cite the results obtained by De la Rica et al. (2008) on their sample 
of workers with low levels of education.  
In the light of these results, in this paper we analyse the gender gap due to 
the differences in the incidence of certain characteristics in Italy, with the 
specific aim of verifying to what degree human capital characteristics – 
                                                 
1 The main contribution of the traditional Oaxaca and Blinder approach (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) 
can be summarised with the idea that the wage gap can be decomposed into two terms: a first term 
representing productivity differences explained by individual characteristics, and a second term 
explaining earnings gaps in terms of differences in the remuneration of those characteristics.   3
education and experience – are responsible for the distribution of the gap. 
More specifically, the aim of this article is twofold: to verify whether the 
dichotomy between highly- and low-educated workers (European 
Commission, 2005) really does imply different patterns of gender pay 
differences in terms of rewards, and to find out whether any other human 
capital characteristics are affecting the pattern of the gap. 
Most of the literature regarding the Italian gender wage gap and its 
components is based mainly on the traditional Oaxaca and Blinder method 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) and evaluates the average level of the gap 
and its components. Addis and Waldmann (1996), using the 1989 cross-
section from the Italian Survey on Household, Income and Wealth (SHIW), 
estimate an average level of the unexplained component to the wage gap as 
equal to 13%. By using the same survey, but on the year 1991, Flabbi 
(1997) evaluates a wage gap due to differences in rewards that ranges 
between 8 and 12 percentage points, depending on the population of 
reference and on the econometric method employed − either OLS or 
Instrumental Variables. ISTAT (2005) estimates an average component of 
the “unexplained” gender gap in gross hourly earnings equal to 11 
percentage points.  
Recently, a couple of works have proposed studying the gender wage gap 
taking distributional aspects into account. Addabbo and Favaro 
(forthcoming) evaluate the extent of the Italian gender wage gap and its 
components based on different educational levels by using the quantile 
estimation procedure and the Machado and Mata (2005) methodology to 
derive marginal distributions of predicted and counterfactual female wages.   4
They show that low-educated women suffer a higher unexplained wage gap 
than their highly-educated colleagues across the whole distribution; 
however, while low-educated female wages appear not to be affected by 
either a sticky-floor effect or a glass-ceiling pattern, there is some evidence 
of a glass-ceiling pattern for highly-educated females.  
Favaro and Magrini (2008), taking their lead from the contribution made by 
Jenkins (1994), develop a non-parametric procedure (based on OLS 
coefficient estimates) to evaluate the probability distribution of the 
“unexplained” part of the wage gap for young females in North-eastern 
Italy.
2 Their results show that the component of the wage gap due to 
differences in rewards based on human capital characteristics increased 
throughout the 1990s across the whole distribution, and that it was more 
accentuated among females earning the highest wages: in general, highly-
educated women suffer lower levels of difference in returns to human 
capital characteristics than low-educated females, yet they experience much 
higher increases in the gap as they move towards the top of the 
distribution. Furthermore, the accumulation of other human capital 
characteristics, such as experience and tenure in the firm, does not help 
them to narrow the wage gap. 
The present paper takes on some of the suggestions to be found in the 
most recent literature in order to study the distribution of the gap due to 
the incidence of human capital characteristics and the relationship between 
such distribution and these characteristics. To this end, we propose using 
the quantile estimate procedure and the methodology proposed by 
                                                 
2 The same method is applied in the present article and it will be discussed in the methodological section 
of the paper.    5
Machado and Mata (2005) in order to obtain marginal distributions from 
the sample data. However, our study suggests using a different tool for the 
analysis of the distribution of the gap. Instead of comparing the quantile 
values of the marginal distributions of theoretical and counterfactual 
retributions, firstly we obtain the marginal distribution of the gap from 
these values, as suggested by Jenkins (1994); we then use the marginal 
distributions of the productive characteristics of women to put together 
the distributions of the gaps based on the distributions of human capital 
characteristics. This procedure allows us to represent clearly and efficiently 
the relationship between human capital characteristics, the size of the gap 
and the likelihood of its existence; furthermore, it also makes it possible to 
identify any fields in which a gap may be found in women’s favour. 
Our analysis is based on a sample of employed workers, 15-65 years old, 
working full time, selected from the last available wave (year 2001) of the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). We focus exclusively on 
employed people primarily because of the lack of satisfactory information 
on self-employed workers (especially on earnings and hours of work), 
which makes any comparison or unified treatment with employed workers 
rather difficult.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
methodological approach adopted and in Section 3 we describe the dataset 
and provide some descriptive statistics. Earnings function estimates and 
the analysis of the wage gap distributions are discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 deals with the conclusions. 
   6
2.  A distributional approach to the analysis of gender differences in 
characteristics’ rewards 
The most recent literature on gender wage differentials has focused on the 
analysis of the breadth of the gap in correspondence with different wage 
levels, while at the same time adopting the traditional breakdown of the 
wage gap in terms of the component explained by gender differences in the 
characteristics and in that due to differences between the two sexes in the 
incidence of these differences, as suggested by the works published in the 
early ‘70s by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). In this literature, the 
Machado and Mata (2005) method is generally applied, which makes it 
possible to reconstruct the marginal differences in theoretical and 
counterfactual earnings, based on coefficients estimated in correspondence 
with the various deciles of wage distribution (in keeping with Koenker and 
Bassett’s 1982 method of quantile regression). This procedure will also be 
adopted in the present paper in which, as outlined above, we shall 
concentrate exclusively on the gap due to differences in earnings based on 
productive characteristics. 
On the other hand, the distributional approach implemented here diverges 
from that used in the above-mentioned literature, insofar as while in those 
works the gap due to the rewards to productive characteristics is evaluated 
as a difference between the decile levels of the marginal distributions of 
the theoretical and counterfactual earnings as considered separately, in the 
present study we evaluate the gap through the construction of a single 
marginal distribution: that of the difference. As well as allowing for the 
evaluation of the probability distribution of the gap values in relation to   7
wage levels, this methodology provides several other possibilities of 
further analysis compared to the tools adopted so far, for it allows us to 
study the distribution of the gap also in relation to the distribution of 
productivity characteristics. As a matter of fact, we may associate the 
marginal distributions of the characteristics as observed to the marginal 
distribution of the gap, based on the various productivity components. In 
our case, we shall focus on the relationship between the gap and the 
characteristics of human capital. 
We proceed to by estimating decile coefficients for the explicative 
variables, using the quantile regression method (Koenker and Bassett, 
1982; Buchinsky, 1998) which consists in evaluating the rewards to 
productive characteristics by allowing for different values in 
correspondence with any chosen decile (or quantile) of the wage 
distribution. 
Given the covariates vector z, the quantile regression allows us to estimate 
() θ Q ω z , corresponding to the  -th  θ quantile of the distribution of the log 
wage (ω), at any  ( ) ∈ θ 0,1 . The quantile regression model is assumed to be 
linear: 
θ θ + β ′ = ω u z         ( 1 )  
where ω is the log of hourly wages
3 and  θ β  is a vector of coefficients: the 
quantile regression coefficients. The distribution of the error term  θ u  is 
unspecified and it is simply assumed that  ( ) θθ = 0 Qu z . The estimated values 
                                                 
3 The wage rate is calculated following the procedure generally exploited when using the ECHP dataset: 
we divide (gross) monthly current wage and salary earnings from the main job by the number of weekly 
hours worked (in the main job), multiplied by the monthly standard number of weeks (4.3).   8
of the  -th θ quantile of the log wages, conditioned to covariates z, is equal 
to:  () θθ ′ ω= β ˆ Qz z . For any  ( ) ∈ θ 0,1 ,  θ β  can be estimated by minimising in  θ β  





















uf o r u
u
uf o r u
      ( 3 )  
The vector of coefficients  θ β  can be obtained by estimating each equation 
either separately or simultaneously. The simultaneous procedure allows us 
to obtain an estimate of the entire variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimated coefficients, which is necessary to implement tests of inter-
quantile differences in the estimated coefficients.
4 Following the procedure 
above described, we obtain the rewards to worker characteristics, by 
specifying different models for females and males; thus, we obtain a vector 
of estimated quantile coefficients for female workers,  ˆ
f θ β  and a vector of 
estimated quantile coefficients for male workers,  ˆ
m θ β . 
Let us bear in mind that the component of the gap due to differences in 
earnings because of productivity characteristics (the evaluation of which is 
the focus of this paper) is given by the difference between the theoretical 
earnings that the woman receives given the incidence of their own 
characteristics as attributed to women on the basis of their productivity 
                                                 
4 The bootstrapping procedure allows us to test whether coefficients of different quantile regressions are 
significantly different.   9
characteristics and the counterfactual earnings, i.e. the wages that women 
might receive were their characteristics to be remunerated at the same level 
as men. Such a difference is given by the outcome of the productive 
characteristics of women given the difference in the remuneration 
coefficients between men and women.  
In order to obtain the marginal distribution of such a gap, once the 
coefficients of men and women’s characteristics have been estimated, we 
firstly calculate their difference, for each characteristic, in correspondence 
with each decile θ. Then, in order to recreate the marginal distribution of 
the gap, we carry on following the Machado and Mata (2005) procedure, or 
the simplified version thereof as set out by Albrecht et al. (2003),
5 which 
consists in recreating a random distribution, based on our sample. This 
may be obtained through the repeated extraction (with reinsertion) of 
women from our sample, to whom we then apply the corresponding 
difference of the estimated coefficients.  
More in detail, we proceed by choosing a decile θ and taking a random 
sample from the female database. Then, we construct the gap due to 
differences in characteristics’ rewards by multiplying the vector of 
characteristics  f z  of the selected individual by the raw vector of 
differences in estimated coefficients ( ) ˆˆ
mf θθ β - β . We repeat that operation 
N=100 times. Then we repeat the procedure for every decile, ending up 
with the estimated marginal distribution of female gaps due to differences 
in characteristics’ rewards. The same procedure is adopted to construct the 
                                                 
5 Albrecht et al. (2003) adopt a simplified version of the methodology proposed by Machado and Mata in 
a mimeo that was later published in the Journal of Applied Econometrics (Machado and Mata, 2005).   10
marginals of the characteristics of human capital that will be used non-
parametrically to estimate the probability distributions of the conditional 
gaps with regard to the various characteristics. 
Having constructed the marginal distributions of the gap due to differences 
in characteristics’ rewards (referred to as the “wage gap” from here 
onwards) and the marginal distributions of characteristics, we then 
estimate conditional density functions non-parametrically in order to 
evaluate the probability of the occurrence of different levels of wage gap, 
based on predicted earnings and on different observed characteristics. 
Let us use F(d) to denote the distribution of the wage gap and F(x) to 
denote the distribution of a variable x that we will explain later on. Next, 
suppose these distributions can be described by density functions, which 
can be indicated with f(d) and f(x) respectively. What we are interested in is 
the relationship between the two distributions or, equivalently, between the 
two density functions; this can be simply written as 




dx x f   x   |   d f ) d ( f       ( 4 )  
where  () f dx is the density of the wage gap conditional on any level x for 
the factor or characteristic of interest. 
From an operational point of view, we obtain an estimate of  () f dx in 
three steps. First, we non-parametrically estimate the joint probability 
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where  K(·) is the kernel function, while  d h  and  x h  are the kernel 
bandwidths.
6 Next, we obtain an estimate of the marginal probability 
density function  ( ) f x  by numerically integrating the joint density function 
with respect to the wage gap.
7 Finally, we obtain the estimate of  () f dx, 
the density function of the pay differential, conditional on estimated 




() x f ˆ
d,x f ˆ
d|x f ˆ =        ( 6 )  
The incidence and direction of the wage gap may thus be studied by 
directly analysing the shape of the three-dimensional plot of the 
conditional density estimate and of the corresponding two-dimensional 
contour plot. At this point, it should be noted that not all characteristics 
can be measured in a continuous space. In such instances, as is the case of 
the level of education and the experience accumulated within the firm,
9 
rather than providing a direct estimate of the density function of the wage 
gap conditional on the values of the discrete variable, we follow an 
alternative approach. Suppose that the characteristic of interest presents l 
levels and group individuals in the sample accordingly so as to obtain l 
subsets. Then, for each subset we estimate the density function of the wage 
                                                 
6 To estimate the joint density function, we use a Gaussian product kernel with bandwidths chosen 
optimally according to Silverman (1986). 
7 In this, we follow the procedure originally suggested by Quah (1996). As an alternative, the marginal 
distribution is often estimated directly using a univariate kernel. However, as pointed out by Overman and 
Ioannides (2001), the two estimators have identical asymptotic statistical properties, and produce very 
similar results in practice. 
8 Under regularity conditions, this represents a consistent estimator for conditional distribution 
(Rosenblatt, 1971; Silverman, 1986; Quah, 1996; Chen, Linton and Robinson, 2001). 
9 As we shall explain later in the paper, ECHP data do not contain a continuous variable measuring tenure 
and we are forced to represent experience accumulated within a firm as a set of dummy variables.   12
gap conditional on estimated earnings (or on any other meaningful 
continuous variable) as in Eq. (6). Each of these estimates therefore shows 
the distribution of wage differentials conditional on estimated earnings, for 
a given level of the characteristic. Moreover, direct comparisons between 
estimates obtained for different levels of the characteristic indicate how 
the conditional distribution is affected by changes in the level of the 
characteristic. 
As for the interpretation of the results, absence of gender wage gaps is 
represented by a concentration of the probability mass along the line 
running parallel to the axis of the conditioning variable and in 
correspondence to a level of wage gap equal to zero, while evidence of 
wage gaps against (in favour of) female workers is signalled by a 
probability mass lying above (below) this horizontal line.  
 
3.  The dataset  
The analysis is carried out on a sample of employed workers aged between 
15 and 65 selected from the 8th wave
10 of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP); we do not include the group of self-employed 
workers due to the unsatisfactory level of information on their earnings 
and hours of work, which makes the comparison with employed workers 
rather difficult, and nor do we include part-time workers.
11  
The model we estimate assumes that the wage level is affected by 
individual characteristics and other characteristics linked to the demand 
                                                 
10 This is the most recent available wave, referring to the year 2001. 
11 Given the unbalanced presence of Italian women and men in part-time work, we prefer to exclude part-
time workers from the sample, in keeping with most of the literature on the analysis of wage differentials.   13
side of the labour market, such as the size of the firm, the sector of 
activity, the type of contract and the regional context of reference. 
Regarding individual characteristics, the ECHP provides information on 
several factors of significant interest in evaluating individual human capital 
endowment; in particular, we may access data on education, the starting 
year of working activity, the number of years of experience in the present 
firm, the level of supervisory responsibility in the current job and the 
professional category. Furthermore, the survey supplies some key 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals, such as 
age, sex, marital status and family composition.  
Following Addabbo and Favaro (forthcoming), who show how Italian 
female to male wage differentials in Italy strongly depend on workers’ 
education attainment, and that the trend of the gap across the female wage 
distribution is rather different between highly and low-educated women, 
we separate workers with a compulsory educational level (low-educated) 
from those with a higher level diploma (highly-educated). We chose this 
categorisation because it fits the structure of the Italian educational system 
and the related occupational opportunities. In Italy, compulsory schooling 
sums a total of up to eight years, subdivided in two cycles: the first, up to 
five years of primary school (the so called “scuola elementare”) and the 
second, three years of lower-secondary school (“scuola secondaria 
inferiore”). Individuals end the compulsory cycle, and decide whether to 
keep on studying when they are between 13 and 14 years old. If they decide 
to stay in school and enter the so-called upper stage of secondary 
education (“scuola secondaria superiore”), they can choose between   14
different educational paths, some more technical-mathematical and other 
more humanistic. Whatever the case may be, if they complete the whole 
cycle of studies, they are allowed to enter university. This educational 
structure leads to quite a strong categorisation in the labour market 
between individuals with a compulsory educational level and those with a 
higher degree of study. As Table A1 shows,
12 the former are mainly forced 
to enter low-skilled operative and blue-collar employment while the latter 
have access to clerical occupations and, if they have a university degree, 
may have better access to managerial positions.  
In light of these considerations, we believe it appropriate to classify 
workers with a compulsory level of education as low-educated, and 
individuals with at least a post-compulsory school diploma as highly-
educated. In international terms, this corresponds to distinguishing 
between educational levels ISCED 0-2 and ISCED 3-7. Given this 
categorisation, the information available in the ECHP dataset makes it 
possible to define some control dummies for individuals with a third level 
of education (ISCED 5-7) that will be included in the estimates related to 
the highly-educated group.  
As for other human capital characteristics that we check for in the 
regression process, we measure two different types of human capital 
acquired after the school: general experience and firm-specific experience. 
The ECHP collects information on the year of an individual’s first entering 
the labour market; by using that information, we construct the number of 
years of potential experience any worker could have accumulated since 
                                                 
12 All descriptive statistics and results reported in the paper are calculated on samples of 15-65 year-old 
individuals, employed full-time.    15
her/his first working experience. Some caution is generally needed when 
using such a “theoretical” measure of experience in analyses on wages and 
gender differentials: the measure may not correspond to the effective years 
spent in the labour market because it does not take into account periods of 
absence from the labour market, owing to unemployment, inactivity, or 
simply illness or parenthood. If this occurred, potential experience would 
overestimate the real number of years of working activity. In general, such 
a measurement problem arises both for males and females; however, as the 
empirical evidence suggests, the problem is more serious for females, due 
to interruptions connected with maternity. We try to address the issue by 
adding, among the explicatory variables, the interaction of potential 
experience with the number of children. If it is true that having children 
implies some penalty in terms of experience, we should detect a negative 
impact of that variable on the level of wages and thus solve the problem at 
least partially. 
We complete the information on individuals’ human capital endowment by 
taking firm-specific experience into account, e.g. the period of permanence 
in the current firm, which we will label “tenure”. Unfortunately, the 
European survey does not provide the precise number of years of tenure 
for all workers, but only for those that have been working in the same firm 
for less than fifteen years. As a consequence, we are not able to know the 
exact period of permanence when workers have been in the present firm 
for more than fifteen years. So, in order to normalise information, we are 
forced to use dummy variables that capture the effect of different periods 
of time: we construct four different intervals corresponding to a period of   16
tenure up to five years, between five and ten years, between eleven and 
fifteen years and longer than fifteen years.  
Since the dataset contains information on the occupational content of jobs 
(principal activity performed and degree of responsibility), we complete the 
empirical model including controls for those aspects, whose relation to 
wage rates can be substantial
13. The inclusion of controls by occupational 
categories
14 is particularly important; indeed, the segregation of women 
into certain occupations can account for a sizable fraction of the wage gap, 
as recently shown in a work by Baynard et al. (2003). Adding controls on 
the degree of responsibility
15 the employee declares to have in her/his job 
is relevant in the light of the fact that responsibility is normally 
remunerated, and not considering it could affect the estimation results on 
human capital characteristics and the evaluation of the components of the 
wage gaps. That said, we are aware that not having a supervisory role in the 
job could, in the female case, be a result of an employer’s discriminatory 
attitude. 
We complete the model by adding controls for the length of the contract − 
distinguishing permanent employment from fixed-term, short-term 
                                                 
13 We also include dummies for macro-economic sectors. 
14 We used 16 occupational categories, taking “elementary occupations in sales and services” as a 
benchmark. 
15 The questionnaire asks the individual if s/he supervises or co-ordinates the work of any personnel and, 
if so, whether s/he has any say in their pay or promotion. On the base of those questions, the database 
defines a categorical variable with value zero if the worker declares not to have any supervisory or co-
ordination position in the business, value 1 if s/he answers positively to the first question, but negatively 
to the second, and value 2 if the interviewee answers positively to both questions. On the basis of this 
information, we construct two dummies to be included in the empirical model: one for individuals with an 
intermediate degree of supervision, and a second for those with a higher supervisory role.   17
contracts and from other types of employment contracts.
16 Finally, we 
account for the size of the firm and for regional factors.  
A summary of the statistics of the variables used in the estimates is to be 
found in the Appendix (Table A2). In average terms, the raw log wage gap 
is against female workers, for both educational levels, and it is significantly 
higher in the case of low-educated than highly-educated women: highly-
educated women suffer, on average, an 8% gap, against a 14% one in the 
case of the low-educated.
17 With regard to human capital characteristics, we 
may observe a slightly higher proportion of women than men with a 
tertiary educational level. Since the sample includes employees up to 65-
year-old, this figure confirms the substantial educational upgrading of 
young females. On the other hand, as to other human capital 
characteristics accumulated after formal education (e.g. experience and 
tenure), men register the highest average levels.  
A few other remarks on sample characteristics are interesting to note. 
Firstly, independently of the educational level, women are more 
concentrated in small firms than men are, and are more likely to be 
employed with fixed-term or short-term contracts. However, being highly-
educated facilitates access to permanent occupations: the frequency of 
temporary contracts decreases when workers, either male or female, are 
highly-educated. 
 
                                                 
16 In the category “other type of contract”, we summarise the categories defined by the ECHP as “casual 
work with no contract” and “other arrangement”. 
17 Throughout the paper, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the extent of log wage gaps (at 
different deciles) as percentages, although we are aware that, for example, a 0.15 log wage difference 
corresponds to a 16.18% gap.   18
Accessing supervisory positions is rather uncommon among low educated 
employees, as only 3% of females and 4.7% of men with this background 
have a high supervisory role in their occupations. The proportion is 
slightly higher (7.6% for females and 10% for males) when considering 
only an average degree of supervision. The difference by sex in accessing 
positions of responsibility is substantial when we look at highly educated 
employees:
18 only 6% of women, compared to 16.4% of men, exercise a 
significant supervisory role, while 12.4% of women and 20.5% of men 
obtain an average degree responsibility. 
 
4.  The distributional analysis 
Before moving on to the main focus of our study − the distributional 
analysis  − let us spend a few words on the estimation results that are 
reported in the Appendix. According to these results, there appear to be 
interesting differences between the rewards for the characteristics of 
workers with different educational levels, and between females and males 
(Tables A3 and A4), in particular with reference to human capital 
characteristics.  
As for highly-educated workers, we might occupy a few lines briefly 
commenting on the estimated results. For this group of workers, the type 
of human capital accumulated after formal education plays a role of great 
relevance in explaining wage upgrading by gender; in line with the evidence 
emerging in the literature on gender wage differentials carried out in other 
countries and with the few studies on Italy, we find that male wages are 
                                                 
18 This is consistent with the existence of vertical occupational segregation by gender in Italy (Rosti, 
2006).   19
more sensitive to general experience − accumulated in the labour market − 
than to specific human capital built up in the firm where working at 
present; on the contrary, female wage upgrading strongly depends on 
specific experience. Going into detail, the return to general experience is 
positively significant for men, even though decreasing with the rise of the 
wage rate and insignificant at very high wage levels. On the other hand, it 
is only slightly significant for women, and only in correspondence to the 
first decile of the distribution and around the median value, its value 
furthermore being half that of men.  
Returning to the rewards for specific experience, i.e. the variable “tenure”, 
our results appear to outline the existence of different models of economic 
reward by gender. Male workers are able to obtain a gradual increase in 
wages as the period of permanence in the firm increases, and that 
upgrading is recognised as from short periods of tenure. On the contrary, 
females achieve statistically significant rewards if the period of permanence 
in the firm becomes particularly long, precisely longer than ten years; 
indeed in that case, returns are higher than what men receive. Likewise, if 
male workers have supervisory roles in the firm, they get incremental 
rewards as coordination tasks become more relevant. On the other hand, 
female workers with supervisory positions are able to achieve economic 
gratification for that position only if they get the highest degree of 
coordination or supervision of any personnel, corresponding to having a 
say in their own pay or promotion. 
The incidence of acquired human capital on the labour market after a 
period of schooling does not appear to substantially affect the retribution   20
levels of low-educated workers. General work experience loses almost all 
its significance when explaining wage levels, if not with regard to very low 
hourly wages (to be found in the first deciles of the distribution), both 
among men and women. On the other hand, unlike what occurs in the 
group of the most highly-educated males and females, specific experience 
gained in the firm in which the individual was working at the moment of 
the survey guarantees wage upgrading only to male workers who have been 
in the company for at least 15 years. Likewise, we may say that supervising 
roles do not guarantee economic recognition for women, unless the 
coordination tasks are of a certain entity, in which case the remuneration 
may be high. Male workers, on the other hand, are attributed wage 
upgrades both when the responsibility tasks are intermediate and at the 
highest levels; in the first case the incidence of a supervising role is 
significant in correspondence with intermediate wage levels, while in the 
latter case, the upgrading is recognised in correspondence with higher 
levels of retribution.  
We may now move on to the investigation of the wage gap based on the 
distributional approach. Before proceeding, two things must be clarified in 
order to facilitate the interpretation of the results. First of all, the wage 
gap is measured here as the difference of log predicted and counterfactual 
wages, expressed in percentage points. Secondly as for the interpretation of 
the figures, the lines reported in all contour plots are percentage contour 
lines. In particular, the value adjacent to each line indicates the percentage 
of the density volume that lies above the line itself (on the vertical axis of 
the three-dimensional plot). So, areas enclosed within a low-value line are   21
in fact associated with a high conditional probability level and thus enable 
us to identify the peaks of the conditional probability density. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The first step is represented by the study of the probability of occurrence 
of a wage gap, conditional on estimated earnings for different levels of 
education. In particular, Figure 1 shows both the three-dimensional and 
the contour plots of the estimates corresponding to low- (upper panes) and 
highly- (lower panes) educated females. Several important features emerge. 
All estimates suggest the existence of substantial gender differences in 
characteristics’ rewards to the disadvantage of female workers, as a large 
share of the conditional density mass is positioned above the horizontal 
line for both levels of education. However, there appears to be 
considerable diversity between education levels with respect to the 
variability of the phenomenon along the range of estimated earnings. To 
see this, let us focus on the 0.9 contour line. In the case of low-educated 
females, we may notice that the variability of the wage gap is extremely 
high for low earning levels, and decreases as earnings increase. In contrast, 
the probability mass for highly-educated females appears to be more 
homogenously distributed along the range of earnings, and in 
correspondence to lower (relative) wage gap levels. In addition to this, the 
extent of the gap decreases as estimated earnings increase for female 
workers with a low educational level, as may be inferred from the fact that 
the corresponding density mass is downward sloping. In contrast, such a   22
negative relationship between differences in rewards to characteristics and 
hourly wages is not so evident for highly-educated females; as a matter of 
fact, the wage gap for women in the highly-educated group appears to 
improve only at very low and high wage levels. In brief, the behaviour of 
the distribution seems to highlight a great disadvantage for low-educated 
women as they enter the labour market, and which is gradually reduced 
(both in terms of range and variability) with the increase in wages, to the 
point of reaching negative values in correspondence with higher wage 
levels, entailing an incidence-based gap in women’s favour. In actual fact, 
the disadvantage corresponding to very low wages may also be found 
among highly-educated women; however, in percentage terms, this 
disadvantage is lesser than that of the low-educated women, and seems to 
regard a subgroup independent of the overall distribution. in fact, this 
appears to be positioned around more or less stable differential values, and 
implies a slight reduction in the wage gap only in the light of the higher 
(hourly) wage levels.  
The model that emerges from this analysis, therefore, is slightly different 
from that found (once again with regard to Italy) by Addabbo and Favaro 
(forthcoming) using the comparison procedure of the decile distribution of 
theoretical and counterfactual wages considered separately. It could not be 
otherwise, since the methodologies feature fundamental differences, i.e. in 
the very construction of the way the gap is distributed. However, our 
results do seem to reconfirm the findings of the Spanish case (de la Rica et 
al., 2008) at least with respect to the group of low-educated female   23
workers; in fact, also in Spain, a differential may be noted which decreases 
steadily with the increase of hourly wage levels. 
An assessment of the incidence of the wage gap may be performed by 
calculating the share of the volume of the estimated conditional density 
that lies above the horizontal line. Such a measure can thus be interpreted 
as the cumulative conditional probability of wage differences against 
female workers. Hence, a value higher (lower) than 50% may be seen as 
evidence of wage gaps against (in favour of) female workers. Additionally, 
making use of horizontal lines with a positive intercept, we may decompose 
this measure according to the incidence of the gap relative to estimated 
earnings. Looking now at the results reported in Table 1, we may then see 
that the cumulative probability of unexplained wage gaps against women is 
higher for highly-educated females than for low-educated ones (equal to 
85.80% and 67.38% respectively). Moreover, the cumulative probability of 
wage gaps against women ranging between 0 and 5% is equal to only 
19.67% for low-educated, compared to a value of 39.60% for highly-
educated; these percentages decrease respectively to 18.02% and 31.14% if 
we evaluate the cumulative probability of wage gaps between 5% and 10% 
of predicted wages. Finally, as we move to wage differentials higher than 
10 percentage points, we find that the cumulative probability for highly-
educated females (equal to 15.06 percentage points) is much lower that the 
cumulative probability for lowly-educated women (amounting to 29.70% of 
predicted wages). 
We may conclude this initial evaluation of the distribution of the wage gap 
between differently educated workers by saying that, in general, lowly-  24
educated females are penalised more than highly-educated women in terms 
of characteristics’ rewards, compared to males with the same educational 
levels. However, females with low educational levels are able to 
substantially upgrade their rewards as they move from low to high wage 
levels, and experience unexplained wage differentials in their favour.  
As pointed out in the methodological section, the procedure we implement 
allows us to evaluate the distribution of the wage gap – conditional to the 
distribution – of any individual characteristic. Whenever the productive 
attribute of interest can be measured in a continuous space, we can directly 
estimate the probability of wage differentials conditional to the values of 
the chosen characteristic. So, Figure 2 reports the estimated conditional 
density functions of the pay gap with respect to the years of experience 
accumulated in the labour market prior to the present occupation, again 
distinguishing between low and high educational levels. While the 
conditional densities are predominantly positioned in the part of the plane 
corresponding to wage differences against female workers both for high 
and low levels of education, the variability of the gap appears to be 
sensibly wider for low-educated females. Looking at the position of the 
density crests in the three-dimensional plots, it appears that a wage gap of 
approximately 5% of the estimated earnings is the most likely outcome at 
all levels of experience and education.  
While the variability of the gap is much higher for low-educated women, 
we note traces, of a glass ceiling effect, but only in the case of highly 
educated women; in fact, with the growth of experience gained on the 
labour market, the distribution of the gap for educated women seems to   25
shift towards slightly higher differential levels. However, in general, work 
experience does not seem to play a significant role in the behaviour of the 
gap.  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
Finally, let us turn to the results that may be drawn from the analysis of 
the relation between wage gaps and workers’ tenure. However, before 
looking at the estimates, it must be noted that here we have chosen to 
follow a different way of partitioning the period of permanence within a 
firm from that adopted while estimating wage functions. On that occasion, 
we constructed four separate dummy variables – corresponding to tenure 
levels of between 0 and 5 years, 6 and 10 years, 11 and 15 years, and more 
than 15 years – and excluded the first from the analysis. Here, in order to 
make use of all available observations and to distribute them as 
homogenously as possible, we grouped the dummies into two simple 
categories. So, while Figure 3 reports the estimated density function of the 
wage gap conditional to estimated earnings for female workers with a 
tenure of 10 years or less, Figure 4 shows the corresponding estimate for 
workers with a tenure of 11 years or more.  
The general picture that emerges from these Figures is quite unambiguous. 
Once more, we find significant evidence of a substantial degree of pay 
differences against female workers given that most of the estimated 
densities lie well above the horizontal line. Besides, through these 
estimates we may further qualify one of the features noticed in the analysis   26
o f  F i g u r e  1 .  T h e r e ,  w e  noted the existence of a negative relationship 
between the extent of the wage gap and the level of predicted earnings for 
lowly-educated females. Looking at the upper panes of Figures 3 and 4, we 
may see that this feature is substantially confirmed for both tenure 
categories. At the same time, the lower panes of the figures also confirm 
the absence of such an evident negative relationship for highly-educated 
workers; in this case we may observe that, unlike what occurs in the overall 
distribution (Figure 1, lower pane), the area that represents 50% of the 
probability distribution follows an initially falling trend which then rises 
slightly starting from an hourly wage of around 3 Euros, suggesting the 
presence of a certain glass ceiling effect.  
However, other interesting features may be recognised through a more 
detailed comparison between the two tenure categories. Concentrating on 
the plots for low educational levels, we may observe that 50% of the 
probability mass of workers with the highest tenure period is concentrated 
on wage gap levels lower than 10%. We may clearly notice that with the 
rise of tenure, the probability of experiencing extremely high wage gaps 
(around 30%) becomes significant for women with very low wage levels; on 
the other hand, the proportion of the probability mass at negative values 
of the wage gap (the gap in favour of women) sharply reduces. In brief, 
low-educated women generally achieve substantial improvements (in the 
wage gap) as their wages increase; however, this upgrading contracts as 
their permanence in the firm becomes longer.  
This result is verified also in the case of highly-educated workers. Indeed, 
we may note that, while female workers with tenure periods of 10 years or   27
less are characterised by pay gaps in their favour for relatively high levels 
of estimated earnings (Figure 3, lower panes), this phenomenon is instead 
totally absent for workers with longer tenure periods. However, in the 
latter case, the variability of the wage gap sharply reduces for women with 
longer tenure periods and, unlike the group of low-educated, the wage gap 
sharply reduces at very low wage levels. Essentially, females with high 
levels of education benefit, in terms of gender differences in productive 
characteristics’ rewards, from staying in the same firm for long periods. 
 
[Figures 3 and 4 around here] 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we evaluate the gender pay gap due to differences in 
characteristics’ rewards by suggesting a distributional approach. In 
particular, the method assigns a probability of occurrence to any level of 
wage differential conditional to any level of a given factor or characteristic.  
The analysis shows that the component of the pay gap due to differences in 
productive characteristics’ rewards between Italian men and women are not 
evenly distributed among workers with different educational endowments 
and other human capital characteristics. As expected, women achieving the 
highest educational levels experience lower pay gaps compared to their 
colleagues with lower education; furthermore, the variability of the wage 
gap along the range of estimated earnings is much higher for the low-
educated than for the highly-educated.    28
Our study also provides some interesting results when the interaction 
between education levels and other human capital characteristics is 
explicitly considered. In summary, the wage gap for low-educated females 
does not appear to be affected significantly by other human capital 
characteristics, such as general or firm-specific experience. This result 
suggests that the downward sloping distribution of the wage gap 
conditional on the wage level could be mainly explained by a positive 
selection of more experienced women earning middle and top wages; this 
confirms what de la Rica et al. (2008) found in the case of Spain. 
Conversely, for females with high educational levels, we may find 
substantial improvements in the wage gap range as workers’ permanence in 
the firm increases, suggesting that gender differences in productivity 
estimated by employers at the beginning of employment may be partially 
unjustified. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1 
Incidence of the unexplained wage gap 
  Educational level 
against / in favour of 
females 
relative to predicted 
wage  High Low 
over 10%  15.06 %  29.70 % 
between 5% and 10%  31.14 %  18.02 %  against 
between 0 and 5%  39.60 %  19.67 % 
in favour    14.20 %  32.60 % 
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Figure 1 
Probability density functions of the unexplained wage gap conditional on 






















































































































Notes: Predicted earnings are expressed in euros. 
Wage gaps are expressed in relative terms with respect to predicted earnings. 
  Estimates use a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth chosen optimally (Silverman 1986).   34
Figure 2 
Probability density functions of the unexplained wage gap conditional on 






































































































Notes: Predicted earnings are expressed in euros. 
Wage gaps are expressed in relative terms with respect to predicted earnings. 
  Estimates use a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth chosen optimally (Silverman 1986).   35
Figure 3 
Probability density functions of the unexplained wage gap conditional on 























































































































Notes: Predicted earnings are expressed in euros. 
Wage gaps are expressed in relative terms with respect to predicted earnings. 
  Estimates use a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth chosen optimally (Silverman 1986).   36
Figure 4 
Probability density functions of the unexplained wage gap conditional on 














































































































Notes: Predicted earnings are expressed in euros. 
Wage gaps are expressed in relative terms with respect to predicted earnings. 
  Estimates use a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth chosen optimally (Silverman 1986). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  
Type of occupation in current job. Distribution by education and gender (%) 
  Highly-educated Low-educated 
  Women   Men  Women   Men 
Legislators, senior officials and managers  0.59 4.49 0.26 0.49 
Professionals 26.97  11.87  0.51  0.10 
Technicians and associate professionals  16.63  19.09  3.58  2.34 
Clerks 38.39  27.83  15.86  7.50 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers  10.04  8.26  18.67  10.33 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  0.00  0.88  2.81  3.31 
Craft and related trades workers  2.85  13.31  21.74  37.23 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers  1.67  9.46  10.23  18.52 
Elementary occupations  2.85  4.81  26.34  20.18 
Our elaborations on ECHP data (Italian sample).    38
Table A2  
Sample descriptive statistics 
 Low-educated    Highly-educated 
  Women Men Women Men 
 mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D.  mean  S.D.
Log hourly wage  2.45 .33  2.59 .32 2.79 .42 2.87 .43 
Married/cohabiting .63  .48  .71 .45 .64 .48 .66 .47 
Upper-stage of secondary education  -  -  -  -  .78 .41 .80 .40 
University education  -  -  -  -  .22 .41 .20 .40 
Experience 18.09 10.96 20.01 11.80 14.45 9.92  15.63  10.40
Experience  squared/10  44.71 43.47 53.91 51.58 30.72 34.25 35.27 36.96
Experience*Children 3.74 7.45 7.26 10.40 5.14 8.00 6.22 9.29
Intermediate supervisory level  .08 .27 .10 .30 .13 .33 .21 .41 
High supervisory level  .03  .17 .05 .21 .07 .26 .17 .37 
Tenure 6-10 years  .14  .35 .12 .32 .15 .36 .16 .36 
Tenure 11-15 years  .12  .33 .10 .30 .11 .32 .11 .31 
Tenure more than 15 years   .31 .46 .33 .47 .34 .47 .36 .48 
Public Sector  .19  .39  .23 .42 .55 .50 .39 .49 
Agriculture .06  .24  .07 .25 .00 .05 .02 .15 
Services .59  .49  .44  .50 .87 .33 .65 .48 
Fixed-term or short-term contract  .11 .32 .07 .26 .07 .26 .05 .22 
Other contract  .09  .29  .08 .27 .03 .16 .02 .02 
Firm size: 5-19 employees  .36  .48 .32 .47 .27 .44 .24 .24 
Firm size: 20-49 employees  .16 .37 .13 .34 .17 .38 .19 .19 
Firm size 50-99 employees  .08 .28 .08 .27 .12 .32 .12 .12 
Firm  size: 100-499 employees  .11 .31 .11 .31 .15 .36  .170  .17 
Firm  size: 500+ employees  .06 .24 .09 .28 .09 .29 .15 .15 
North-west .08  .28  .07 .25 .12 .32 .10 .10 
North-east .16  .36  .01 .29 .12 .32 .11 .11 
South and Islands  .20  .40  .35 .48 .25 .43 .28 .28 
Source: Descriptive statistics on ECHP 2001 sample   39
Table A3  
Quantile regressions – Highly-educated workers  
 Women  Men 
  10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































R2  .378 .335 .319 .322 .328 .349 .377 .410 .437 .313 .304 .309 .318 .329 .353 .380 .412 .453 
Observations  831  1044 
t-values in brackets.  
The specifications include dummies by firm size, macro-region and  occupational category. Complete tables available upon request.   40
Table A4  
Quantile regressions – Low-educated workers  
 Women  Men 
  10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































R2  .446 .343 .285 .252 .236 .235 .240 .269 .330 .286 .229 .219 .209 .201 .205 .202 .201 .207 
Observations  288  742 
t-values in brackets.  
The specifications include dummies by firm size, macro-region and  occupational category. Complete tables available upon request. 
 